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THE “BLAINE” DEBATE:  MUST STATES 
FUND RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS? 
LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER* 
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,1 the United States Supreme 
Court held—by a vote of 5 to 4—that the funding of religious 
schools with taxpayer money through voucher programs does not 
violate the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.2  
Emboldened by this success, voucher proponents now attack state 
constitutional provisions (often called “Blaine Amendments”)3 that 
prohibit taxpayer funding of religious schools.  These state 
provisions, which may stand in the way of religious-school voucher 
programs, are attacked as violative of the federal Constitution, 
rooted in anti-religious bias, or otherwise illegal or unwise. 
It is my view that efforts to force states to fund religious 
schools through voucher plans or otherwise will and should fail.  My 
reasons for this conclusion are two-fold.  First, there is no viable 
                                                          
*Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.  This article includes 
remarks given at a symposium co-sponsored by the Pew Forum on Religion 
and Public Life and the University of North Carolina School of Law on March 
28, 2003, and I would like to thank the participants in that symposium for their 
comments. 
1. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
2. Id. at 648–63. 
3. In 1875, Congressman James G. Blaine of Maine introduced a federal 
constitutional amendment that would have prohibited the payment of 
money—raised by taxation, in any state, for the support of public schools—to 
institutions under religious control. See LLOYD P. JORGENSON, THE STATE 
AND THE NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL, 1825–1925, at 138–40 (1987).  Although this 
federal amendment failed, contemporary state constitutional prohibitions that 
prohibit public funding for religious schools are often collectively called 
“Blaine Amendments” or “Little Blaines” by their opponents.  This is true 
even though, in many cases, these state laws predated the federal Blaine 
Amendment by decades, were born of different political circumstances, or 
are—in their current forms—the products of twentieth century law reform 
projects. 
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federal constitutional argument that states are required to fund 
religious institutions, including religious schools. Second, there are 
excellent reasons why the funding of religious institutions is very 
bad and dangerous policy—reasons which states are free to use as 
the groundings for their own policies, and which the decision in 
Zelman has left untouched. 
I.  THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION 
In Zelman, the Supreme Court narrowly held that the 
federal Establishment Clause presents no barrier to the 
establishment of a state educational voucher program that includes 
the funding of religious schools.  This decision rests, fundamentally, 
on the idea that because voucher money is given to an individual, 
who then transfers it to a religious school, there is an insufficient 
association of the state with the religious institution to trigger 
federal Establishment Clause guarantees.4 
I believe that Zelman was wrongly decided.  To my mind, 
government cannot deliberately rid itself of public functions and 
public liabilities through the simple insertion of private 
decisionmaking between its actions and the anticipated and 
authorized results of those actions.5  However, Zelman held that 
federal Establishment Clause jurisprudence will not make that 
connection, and so,  as a result,  states are not prohibited by that 
Clause from voucher funding of religious schools. The question that 
voucher proponents now press is something else.  We know, after 
Zelman, that the federal Constitution does not prohibit states from 
(voucher) funding of religious schools, but the question remains:  
does the federal Constitution demand that they do so? 
The idea that states are required to fund religious 
                                                          
4. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652 (“[W]here a government aid program . . . 
provides assistance [to] . . . citizens, who, in turn, direct government aid to 
religious schools . . . as a result of their own . . . private choice, the program is 
not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause.”). 
5. Laura S. Underkuffler, Vouchers and Beyond:  The Individual As 
Causative Agent in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 167 (2000) 
(arguing that public voucher money cannot simply be laundered through 
“private choice” as a way to avoid Establishment Clause guarantees). 
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institutions, through vouchers or otherwise, is not something that 
the Supreme Court has ever addressed, let alone endorsed.6  
Indeed, the Court’s decisions over the past fifty years have been 
grounded in the opposite assumption:  that state funding of 
religious institutions is something which involves palpable problems 
and dangers, and therefore is something with which we, as a 
constitutional matter, only reluctantly and incidentally agree.  
Voucher proponents would turn this area of jurisprudence on its 
head.  Not only would the Constitution allow such funding—it 
would command it. 
Voucher proponents argue—in a claim that is initially 
limited to vouchers, but that would conceivably apply to any kind of 
public funding—that if a state program funds secular schools, then 
that program must fund religious schools as well.  Their particular 
targets are state constitutional provisions (“Blaine Amendments”) 
that explicitly or implicitly prohibit the payment of public money to 
religious institutions, including religious schools.  They argue that 
such laws are unconstitutional because they discriminate against 
religious institutions and religious individuals in violation of Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clause guarantees.7 
To build their claim, voucher proponents generally begin 
with one of the Supreme Court’s seemingly grand statements of 
equality.  For instance, the Court has stated that government must 
favor “neither one religion over others[,] nor religious adherents 
collectively over nonadherents.”8  Such statements are, voucher 
                                                          
6. Indeed, the Court has indicated that states are free to adopt more 
stringent church/state separation than what the federal Constitution requires.  
See, e.g., Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489 
(1986) (although the state program in question did not run afoul of the federal 
Establishment Clause, “[o]n remand, the state court is of course free to 
consider the applicability of the ‘far stricter’ dictates of the Washington State 
Constitution”). 
7. Although the targets of complaint are most often state laws that 
explicitly except religious institutions from public funding programs, the same 
arguments can be made against any state constitutional provision or law that 
restricts funding to “public” or “secular” institutions.  In all such cases, 
“discrimination” against religious institutions and individuals arguably exists, 
since their causes are not the equal recipients of government largesse. 
8. Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696 (1994) (plurality opinion). 
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proponents argue, clear statements of a federal, constitutional, 
“nondiscrimination” guarantee. 
Although there is a certain superficial appeal to this 
argument, even casual reflection compels the conclusion that such 
statements cannot have the sweeping and a-contextual meaning 
that voucher advocates imply.  Never has the Supreme Court held 
that religion and nonreligion must be treated equally for all 
purposes under the Constitution.  Indeed, the idea that religion and 
nonreligion must be treated equally for all purposes is a completely 
implausible proposition.  The First Amendment’s Free Exercise 
and Establishment Clauses are themselves testaments to the fact 
that religion is afforded certain privileges and is subjected to 
particular disabilities in ways that nonreligion is not.  Cases dealing 
with the protection of free religious exercise, the protection of 
religious conscience, the avoidance of endorsement of religion by 
government, the separation of government and religious 
institutional authority, and so on, are premised on the obvious 
assumption that religion is both a specially privileged and a 
specially restricted category in constitutional jurisprudence. 
Indeed, it is highly unlikely that voucher proponents who 
advance this argument truly want equality of treatment of religion 
and nonreligion by law.  Most generally have no desire that 
religion’s special privileges—such as exemptions from state land-
use laws, exemptions from federal draft laws, exemptions from state 
immunization laws, exemptions from employers’ work rules, 
exemptions from state lobbying restrictions, and so on—be 
abolished in the name of “equality.”  Rather, they envision a system 
in which religion retains its difference from other (secular) belief 
systems when it comes to benefits, but loses its difference from 
other (secular) belief systems when it comes to disabilities. 
This is an enviable goal but an impossible one.  It is 
impossible because the same characteristics that entitle religion to 
special protection in law are also the reasons for its disabilities.  We 
protect religious conscience and we worry about the funding of 
religion by government for the same reason:  because of the 
particular value, power, and consequent dangers that religious 
beliefs present.  If religion is “just another personal belief system” 
in one context, then it is “just another personal belief system” in the 
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other.  To adopt the broad notion of “equality” or “neutrality” that 
voucher proponents urge would require the abolition of all of the 
special privileges under law that religion now enjoys.  It would also 
require us to dismantle the core ideas about religious difference 
that have grounded our convictions about religious freedom and 
separation of church and state for more than two centuries. 
Obviously, a more nuanced understanding of the idea of 
equality of religion and nonreligion is required.  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has applied this concept in three settings, which 
voucher advocates cite:  where religious persons are subjected to 
discrimination because of their status, or identity, as religious 
persons;9 where religious viewpoints are excluded from otherwise 
open, public fora;10 and where religious practices are limited or 
proscribed solely because of hostility on the part of state actors to 
the religious nature of those practices.11 
None of these situations resemble the question before us. 
The refusal of a state to fund religious education (or other religious 
activities) does not discriminate against religious persons on the 
basis of their status or identity as religious persons.  In McDaniel v. 
Paty, the case on which this kind of equality is based, the Supreme 
Court held that a state law that prohibited a “minister” or “priest” 
from holding public office “because of his status as a ‘minister’ or 
‘priest’ ” offended the Free Exercise Clause of the federal 
Constitution.12  In other words, government cannot deny a civil 
right or other benefit, otherwise afforded to all, because an 
individual is a Jew, Catholic, Mormon, Muslim, priest, minister, 
imam, or of no religious affiliation at all.  This injunction is clear 
and unequivocal.  It is not, however, what state refusal to fund 
religious schools or other religious institutions involves.  Individuals 
are unable to secure state money, under the challenged state laws, 
                                                          
9. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
10. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 
U.S. 819 (1995); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 
753 (1995) (plurality opinion); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free 
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
11. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 
U.S. 520, 524 (1993). 
12. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 627. 
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not because of their identity or status as religious persons—they are 
unable to secure this money because of the use to which that money 
would be put. 
Voucher advocates respond to this analysis by arguing that 
this analysis understands “religious status” or “religious identity” 
too narrowly.  They argue that “religious status” encompasses not 
only membership in a religious organization, but also all of the 
practices and activities that the religion in question involves.  If one 
is a religious person, and if being a religious person involves 
attending religious schools, then the ineligibility of religious 
schooling for public funding is a “religious status” claim.  
Nonreligious persons, they argue, get their schooling funded; 
therefore, religious persons must get their schooling funded, if the 
state is to avoid a “religious status” claim. 
The sheer scope of this claim is breathtaking. What, exactly, 
are its limits?  If the ability to attend religious schools is part of 
“religious status,” why not the ability to attend religious gatherings? 
Or the ability to pursue religious rituals? Or the ability to 
experience religious governance? Or the ability to engage in 
religious cultural expression? Indeed, why doesn’t the religious 
counterpart of any and every funded secular activity present a 
“religious status” claim?  Under the logic of this argument, for 
every secular (state) service, function, benefit, program, or 
institution, there must be a religious alternative—or else, by explicit 
or implicit exclusion, religious persons are penalized by their 
inability to engage in those (religious) practices and activities that 
secular society affords to its members.  If the state provides voucher 
funding for secular schools, it must provide voucher funding for 
religious ones; if the state funds secular counseling, or health, or 
other services, it must fund religious ones; if the state funds secular 
art, or music, or other cultural activities, it must fund religious ones; 
if the state funds secular meetings, conferences, or societies, it must 
fund religious ones; and so on.  Under no conceivable 
interpretation does the McDaniel principle go so far. 
The principle behind the “public fora” cases is also 
inapposite to the question of compelled state funding of religious 
schools.  In those cases, the Supreme Court held that where a forum 
for public speech is created or maintained by government, equal 
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access to that forum must be given, if requested, to the religious 
viewpoint.13  Citing these cases, voucher advocates claim that 
elementary and secondary schools are “public fora” and, thus, 
religious schools must be funded equally with secular ones.  How a 
private religious school can be a “public forum” is, however, 
unexplained.  In addition, if religious schools are “public fora” for 
the religious viewpoint, surely churches, synagogues, mosques, and 
other religious institutions are as well.  The idea that religious 
institutions must be equally funded with taxpayer dollars in order to 
ensure “viewpoint neutrality” stretches this principle beyond 
recognition.  It also contradicts the Court’s unbroken view that 
government should, as far as possible, avoid the business of 
religious funding. 
Finally, voucher proponents argue that the anti-
discrimination principle of Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. 
v. City of Hialeah demands equal funding of religious schools.  In 
Lukumi, the Court held that if “the object or purpose of a law is the 
suppression of religion or religious conduct,” then the Free 
Exercise Clause demands that it be justified by a compelling 
government interest.14  This case is also inapt.  The object or 
purpose of a government’s refusal to fund religion is not the 
suppression of religious conduct—it is avoidance of the 
divisiveness, strife, and violations of conscience that forcing 
taxpayers to fund the religions of others involves.  Such concerns 
are not only permissible ones for government—they have been 
assumed to undergird our essential understandings of First 
Amendment guarantees for more than two hundred years.15 
There is, thus, no existing Supreme Court jurisprudence that 
                                                          
13. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828–37 (requiring equal access to 
university-sponsored plan which would pay for a student newspaper’s printing 
costs); Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 392–94 (requiring equal access to school 
facilities for after-school activities); Pinette, 515 U.S. at 760–63 (requiring 
equal access to a state-owned square). 
14.  Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533. 
15. See, e.g., Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious 
and the Secular:  A Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 837, 930–56 (1995) (discussing historical roots and 
contemporary understandings of no-funding guarantees). 
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can reasonably be interpreted to require that states fund religious 
schools or other religious institutions.  As we look to the future, 
however, the question remains whether this is a necessary or 
desirable result, or whether it is, in fact, ill-founded. 
II.  THE DEEPER ISSUE 
The push to fund religious schools through vouchers and 
other schemes has pressed an underlying question.  Whatever the 
current state of the law might be, perhaps it is time to change it.  As 
one commentator wrote five years ago: 
There is nothing inherently undemocratic 
about providing public funds for children to 
attend religious schools.  The practice is quite 
common in Western nations, where it is 
perceived as an expression of religious liberty 
to enable parents to educate their children in 
accord with the dictates of their faiths. . . . Since 
1992, even socialist Sweden has begun to 
provide government support to private and 
religious schools in response to pleas from 
religious and language minorities.16 
In the United States, no one denies the right of parents to 
choose private schooling, including religious schooling, for their 
children.17  Rather, the question is whether taxpayers must fund the 
schooling that those parents choose. Proponents often set forth a 
reassuring assessment of public funding of religious education in 
the United Kingdom and Europe as evidence that historical 
concerns on such funding in this country are overdrawn. Is the 
experience abroad really so reassuring? 
In the spring of 2001, I was contacted by Harry Judge of 
                                                          
16. Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine’s Wake:  School Choice, The First 
Amendment, and State Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 657, 
665 (1998) (citations omitted). 
17. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518 (1925) (holding that 
a state’s role in the education of its citizens must yield to the right of parents 
to provide an equivalent education for their children in a privately operated 
school, including a religious school, of the parents’ choosing). 
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Oxford University to see if I would contribute to a special issue of 
the Oxford Review of Education.  This issue, with contributions 
from scholars throughout the United Kingdom, would deal with 
what has become an extremely divisive social and political issue:  
taxpayer funding of religious education. 
It seems that the pacific ideal of taxpayer funding of 
religious schools in the United Kingdom and Europe that American 
commentators have touted is, in fact, crumbling in the face of 
increasing religious diversity.  In these countries there has been, for 
instance, fast growth of Islamic communities, including those of a 
traditional or fundamentalist nature. These communities, quite 
understandably, now demand the equal public funding of their 
schools.  With these demands has come difficult and divisive 
controversy.  Although the citizens of these countries were very 
willing to publicly fund the schools of the religions with which they 
felt comfortable, they are not prepared to publicly fund religious 
schools that advance views the majority finds alien, disturbing, anti-
assimilationist, or otherwise outside their conceptions of 
mainstream British or European values.  As a result of the public 
crisis that this issue has caused, the attitudes of citizens—as 
assessed by a former chairman of the United Kingdom’s 
Commission for Racial Equality—“appear to be hardening and 
intolerance to differences is growing.”18  As Harry Judge has 
written, 
Confidence in the extension of faith-based 
schools, in England at least, seems to be based 
on the unspoken assumption that most of the 
new state funding will go to the “mainstream” 
Christian groups . . . .  It does not appear that 
those promoting such developments have yet 
given a great deal of thought to the broad 
implications of a significantly wider extension 
of such financial support, including support for 
groups which have not yet asserted 
                                                          
18. Harry Judge, Faith-Based Schools and State Funding:  A Partial 
Argument, 27 OXFORD REV. EDUC. 463, 473 (2001) (quoting ECONOMIST, 
Sept. 21–Oct. 5, 2001, at 58). 
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themselves.19 
Indeed, as Chris Hewer, Advisor on Inter-Faith Relations to the 
Bishop of Birmingham, has written, “Perhaps if we were starting 
today with a completely[,] if implausibly clean slate, we would make 
all schools ‘secular,’ teach all pupils about all faiths, and leave 
religious inculcation to the religious establishments outside 
schools.”20 
The people of the United Kingdom, who have tacitly 
assumed that public funding would be extended only to 
“acceptable” religions, are not alone in their assumptions.  For 
instance, when respondents in this country were asked in a New 
York Times/CBS News Poll whether it would be “a good idea for 
the federal government to give money to religious organizations to 
provide social services like job training and drug treatment 
counseling,” 66% answered affirmatively.  However, when asked 
whether this would be true “if . . . the government would be giving 
money to religious organizations like the Nation of Islam, Church 
of Scientology, and the Hare Krishnas,” only 29% agreed.21  One 
can only guess what the approval figures would have been for 
religious groups such as the Branch Davidians, the Children of 
God, and Wiccans.  What about taxpayer funding for schools that 
teach white supremacy, or that AIDS is a curse that God has 
wrought on homosexual sinners, or that the religious teachings of 
others—Judaism, Catholicism, Islam, etc.—are evil or dangerous 
heresy?  What about taxpayer funding for religious schools that 
teach, as a matter of religious command, that girls are by nature 
inferior to boys, or that “ ‘the wife is to subordinate herself to her 
husband’ and that ‘the woman is to place herself under the 
authority of the man[,]’ in the same way that ‘the church is to place 
herself under the protection of Christ?’ ”22 
                                                          
19. See id. at 469–70. 
20. Chris Hewer, Schools for Muslims, 27 OXFORD REV. OF EDUC. 515, 
525 (2001). 
21. Richard L. Berke & Janet Elder, 60 Percent Favor Bush, But 
Economy is Major Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2001, at A1. 
22. Jennifer Lee, Attack on Judicial Nominee Leads Panel to Delay Vote, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2003, at A22 (quoting published (and controversial) 
religious views of a federal judicial nominee). 
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In fact, the vaunted “religious tolerance” in this country is 
very superficial.  After the events of September 11, 2001, the 
unjustified backlash against Muslims was obvious and dangerous.  
Indeed, we in North Carolina recently experienced our own episode 
of religious intolerance and divisiveness.  In the summer of 2002, in 
an effort to “stimulate discussion and critical thinking around a 
current topic,” incoming students to the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill were directed to read Approaching the 
Qur’an:  The Early Revelations, a book translated and introduced 
by Michael Sells, a Haverford College professor.23  When the 
assignment of this book was publicly discovered, vehement 
reactions followed. One campus evangelist labeled the actions 
“offensive” on the ground that “this country was founded on 
Christianity, not the Qur’an.”24  A television talk show host 
commented that he didn’t know “what this serves[,] to take a look 
at our enemy’s religion.”25  A lawsuit was filed in federal court 
against the university, alleging that the university was promoting 
Islam and encouraging students’ conversion.  The North Carolina 
House Appropriations Committee voted 62–10 to bar funding for 
the university’s summer reading program during state budget 
hearings.  Lead counsel for the plaintiffs in the federal lawsuit 
stated ominously, “We think that what we’ve uncovered so far is 
just the tip of the iceberg.”26 
To forestall such divisive and bitter battles over public 
funding of religion, many states have either flatly prohibited 
taxpayer funding of religious institutions, or prohibited it implicitly 
by restricting public funding to public institutions.27  Indeed, to the 
                                                          
23. See APPROACHING THE QUR’AN:  THE EARLY REVELATIONS 
(Michael Sells trans., 1999). 
24. See Norm Pattis, Defining What’s Dangerous:  A Public Scared of Its 
Shadow, 28 CONN. L. TRIB. 17 (2002). 
25. The O’Reilly Factor:  Impact:  Interview With Robert Kirkpatrick (Fox 
News television broadcast, July 10, 2002) (transcript on file with First 
Amendment Law Review). 
26. Eric Ferreri, Quran Suit Not Resolved:  Complaint Against UNC 
Amended, Attacking Its Claims as Misleading, HERALD SUN (Durham, N.C.), 
Nov. 24, 2002, at A1. 
27. Many states have such laws. 
[No] grant, appropriation or use of public money . . . shall 
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extent that we have achieved religious tolerance in this country, it 
is, in my view, precisely because we have enforced separation of 
church and state, particularly in areas as divisive and controversial 
as elementary and secondary education.  We have not forced 
approval of religious groups and their practices as a public issue—
we have not forced taxpayers to fund groups, activities, and beliefs 
with which they deeply disagree.  It is precisely this confluence of 
issues that the idea of separation of church and state in this country 
was designed to prevent. 
Voucher advocates have several answers to these dangers.  
First, they argue that these dangers can be avoided if the practices 
or teachings of participating schools are monitored and controlled, 
either through denying participation to particularly offensive 
groups outright, or by enumerating particular practices or teachings 
that are unacceptable in participating schools.  For instance, schools 
                                                          
be made or authorized by the Commonwealth or any 
political subdivision thereof for the purpose of founding, 
maintaining or aiding any . . . institution, primary or 
secondary school, or charitable or religious undertaking 
which is not publicly owned and under the exclusive 
control, order and supervision of public officers or public 
agents [nor shall any such] . . . grant, appropriation or use 
of public money . . . be made or authorized for the 
purpose of founding, maintaining or aiding any church, 
religious denomination or society. 
MASS. CONST. AMEND. art. XVIII § 2. 
No public monies . . . shall be appropriated or paid . . . 
directly or indirectly to aid or maintain any private, 
denominational or other nonpublic, pre-elementary, 
elementary, or secondary school.  No payment, credit, tax 
benefit, exemption or deductions, tuition voucher, 
subsidy, grant or loan of public monies . . . shall be 
provided, directly or indirectly, to support the attendance 
of any student [in such a school]. 
MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2. 
“No public money . . . shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious 
worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious 
establishment.” WASH. CONST. art. I § 11.  “All schools maintained or 
supported wholly or in part by the public funds shall be forever free from 
sectarian control or influence.” WASH. CONST. art. IX § 4. 
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run by religious “cults” that lack particular institutional credentials 
could be excluded, or schools that engage in discriminatory 
practices such as religious admissions tests, or those with teachings 
that a majority of citizens find offensive, could be disqualified.28 
In my view, any such efforts will either prove to be entirely 
superficial, or, if not, will be practically unworkable and held 
constitutionally invalid.  Simple requirements for nondiscrimination 
in admissions will hardly solve the problem, since it is highly 
unlikely that those who deeply disagree with a religion’s practices 
will apply for the admission of their children to that religion’s 
schools, or, if they did, that the presence of those children will have 
any real impact on those schools’ practices.  With any more 
profound attempt to control religious schools, however, serious 
problems begin.  Any attempt to distinguish “acceptable” from 
“unacceptable” religious groups would violate the guarantee of 
equal treatment of all religions by the law, which the Establishment 
Clause unquestionably requires.29  Although the prohibition of 
certain practices or policies—such as overt engagement in racial 
discrimination—might be possible, on the ground that the federal 
constitutional prohibitions on race discrimination outweigh any 
conceivable argument that religious schools might make, the 
constitutionality of attempts to disqualify other practices—such as 
preferential admissions for co-religionists, or religious or gender 
discrimination (on religious grounds) in the hiring of faculty and 
staff—is far less clear.30  When one moves to control the content of 
                                                          
28. For instance, the voucher plan in Zelman excluded schools that 
“discriminate on the basis of race, religion or ethnic background,” or 
“advocate or foster unlawful behavior or teach hatred of any person or group 
on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion.” Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 645 (2002). 
29. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624, 642 
(1943) (“[I]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that 
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.”); id. at 658 (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that choice of particular groups by government would 
“resurrect the very discriminatory treatment of religion which the Constitution 
sought forever to forbid”). 
30. Indeed, it is because of the power of competing free exercise claims 
asserted by religious groups that religious institutions enjoy broad exemptions 
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teaching in religious schools, the constitutional and practical 
problems that are presented become unworkable.  Any effort by 
the state to directly censor or control the content of teachings by 
religious schools would (rightly) be seen as an infringement on the 
constitutional guarantee of religious free exercise, and any effort to 
do this indirectly through eligibility for government funding would 
undoubtedly be challenged as an unconstitutional condition that 
requires, for participation in a government program, 
relinquishment of a constitutional right.31  In addition, the 
eradication of offensive teachings from religious classrooms 
pursuant to such laws would require continual, substantive, and 
intrusive surveillance, something which such schools would be 
unwilling to tolerate and which public authorities could not 
realistically enforce. 
Voucher advocates next argue that although these problems 
might be real when religious schools are directly funded by 
taxpayer money, they are not real when such funding is by virtue of 
“parental choice.”  They argue that when parents choose religious 
beneficiaries, the state is not associated by taxpayers with the 
funded activities.  As a result, all of the identified dangers of state 
funding vanish.  This argument echoes the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Zelman, in which the Court held that the funding of 
religious schools with taxpayer money through voucher programs 
does not violate the Establishment Clause of the federal 
Constitution.  In so doing, the Court did not hold that there is no 
constitutional problem with state funding of religious institutions.  
                                                          
from anti-discrimination claims under civil rights laws.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(e)(2) (stating that an employer may employ persons of a particular 
religion (to the exclusion of others) if the employer is an educational 
institution that is, in whole or substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, 
or managed by a particular religion or religious organization, or if the 
curriculum of the institution is directed toward the propagation of a particular 
religion). 
31. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518–19 (1958) (discussing 
this doctrine in the First Amendment context); cf. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 
173, 196–98 (1991) (concluding speech restrictions imposed as a condition for 
receiving federal family-planning money were not unconstitutional, since they 
did not deny recipients the right to engage in protected activities, but rather 
“refused to fund such activities out of the public fisc”). 
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Instead, the Court held that voucher programs are not state funding 
at all.  This is because, in the Court’s view, the passage of the 
money through the hands of parents removes the state as the 
“actor” in those cases.  If money is paid to religious schools, it is 
parents, not the state, who are making these choices.  Thus, the 
Establishment Clause—with its purposes and prohibitions—is 
simply irrelevant.32 
This theory, which I have called the “theory of the 
individual as causative agent,”33 is not new in constitutional 
jurisprudence.  In Norwood v. Harrison,34 the Supreme Court was 
confronted with a state funding scheme in which textbooks were 
purchased by the state and lent to students in both public and 
private schools, including all-white private academies.  This lending 
program was established to enhance “educational choice” and to 
circumvent  prohibitions on direct public funding of schools that 
engaged in discrimination on the basis of race.  Proponents argued 
that this funding scheme was beyond constitutional cognizance 
because the decisions of parents to send their children to all-white 
schools was a matter of private choice.  The Supreme Court 
rejected this argument, and chose instead to see the substance of 
the transaction for what it was. The Court held the program 
unconstitutional, since “ ‘a state may not induce, encourage, or 
promote private parities to accomplish what it is constitutionally 
forbidden to accomplish.’ ”35 
To my mind, the Court’s view in Norwood captures the 
nature of such transactions far more accurately than does its 
Zelman rationale.  The idea that state voucher programs involve 
individual (not state) funding begs reality, when the state authorizes 
and anticipates individual transfer of state-provided funds to 
recipients who provide a service (education) in which the state 
retains a vital interest, and which the state would otherwise be 
required to provide.  These are programs in which individual 
                                                          
32. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 616–17. 
33. See, Underkuffler, supra note 5. 
34. 413 U.S. 455 (1973). 
35. Id. at 465 (quoting Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 
458, 475–76 (M.D. Ala. 1967)). 
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decisions to forward voucher money to religious schools are 
entirely related, anticipated, and authorized actions, which 
accomplish the goal—the public funding (of public and private) 
education—that the state has previously identified.  Certainly, 
states are free to conclude that in the public mind, the substantial 
funding of schools through vouchers will be seen as the public 
funding of those schools, with all of the contentiousness that such 
funding schemes present.36  Indeed, voucher advocates themselves 
acknowledge this reality.  Although they insist on the one hand that 
there is no connection between the state and voucher-funded 
schools, they simultaneously urge, on the other hand, that racially 
discriminatory or other undesirable schools not be funded through 
these programs, because of the legal and political difficulties that 
state funding of such schools would create. 
There are, in short, excellent reasons why states might wish 
to prohibit the public funding of religious schools through public 
voucher programs, whether that prohibition is accomplished by 
“Blaine Amendments” or otherwise. 
Finally, voucher advocates argue that “Blaine 
Amendments” and other state laws that prohibit public funding of 
religious schools were born in the throes of religious bigotry, and 
thus should be struck down on that basis.  Whatever abstract 
notions one might concoct to justify such laws, the truth, it is 
argued, is that these laws, were motivated by anti-Catholic bias.37 
                                                          
36. State court decisions that have so concluded include California 
Teachers Ass’n v. Riles, 632 P.2d 953, 960–64 (Cal. 1981); Holmes v. Bush, No. 
CV 99-3370, 2002 WL 1809079 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 5, 2002); Spears v. Honda, 
449 P.2d 130, 134–38 (Haw. 1968); Epeldi v. Engelking, 488 P.2d 860, 865–66 
(Idaho 1971); Fannin v. Williams, 655 S.W.2d 480, 482–84 (Ky. 1983); Opinion 
of the Justices to the Senate, 514 N.E.2d 353, 356–57 (Mass. 1987); Paster v. 
Tussey, 512 S.W.2d 97, 103–05 (Mo. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1111 (1975); 
Dickman v. School District No. 62C, 366 P.2d 533, 539–42 (Ore. 1961), cert. 
denied, 371 U.S. 823 (1962); Elbe v. Yankton Independent School District No. 
63-3, 372 N.W.2d 113, 117 (S.D. 1985); Almond v. Day, 89 S.E.2d 851, 856–57 
(Va. 1955); Chittenden Town School District v. Department of Education, 738 
A.2d 539, 563 (Vt. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1066 (1999); Weiss v. Bruno, 
509 P.2d 973, 980–81 (Wash. 1973). 
37. See, e.g., Judge, supra note 18, at 659 (stating that the Blaine 
Amendment and its progeny are “remnant[s] of nineteenth century religious 
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It is necessary to face the religious bigotries that have 
infected our national history, and which continue to infect it. 
Indeed, that reality is the cornerstone of my position.  Knowledge 
of such historical sentiments does not, however, broadly invalidate 
all laws passed during such periods, as voucher proponents argue. 
There are several reasons that demand this conclusion.  
First, it is virtually impossible to untangle the sentiments that 
“motivated” the original drafters, ratifiers, or supporters of these 
laws, or which have resulted in their continued inclusion in state 
constitutional and statutory schemes.  As historians have noted, 
legal prohibitions against public funding of religious schools were 
the products of far more diverse political, religious, and educational 
concerns than simple anti-Catholic animus, or any other 
particularly identifiable view.38 In addition, whatever the origins of 
these laws, many have been reconsidered and re-ratified by 
legislative action and popular vote during far more contemporary 
times.39 Although bias against particular religious groups might 
                                                          
bigotry promulgated by nativist political leaders who were alarmed by the 
growth of immigrant populations and who had a particular disdain for 
Catholics”). 
38. See, e.g., JORGENSON, supra note 3. 
39. For instance, article I section 3 of the Constitution of Florida 
prohibits the payment of public monies “directly or indirectly in aid of any 
church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution.” 
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3.  When the 1968 Constitutional Revision Commission 
proposed this section’s removal, “the Florida Legislature took action to retain 
and to strengthen” the restriction. Holmes, No. CV 99-3370 at 5.  Article IX, 
section 8 of the Constitution of California provides, “No public money shall 
ever be appropriated for the support of any sectarian or denominational 
school, or any school not under the exclusive control of the officers of the 
public schools.” CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 8.  An attempt to amend this principle 
to allow school vouchers was defeated overwhelmingly by voters in 1993.  See 
Cynthia Bright, The Establishment Clause and School Vouchers:  Private 
Choice and Proposition 174, 31 CAL. W.L. REV. 193 (1995).  During the New 
York State Constitutional Convention of 1967, a concerted effort was made to 
remove article IX, section 3 of the Constitution of New York, which 
prohibited funding of religious schools. “[T]he proposed repeal . . . initiated 
three months of religious dissension throughout the state; the battle was fierce 
and unseemly, and the wounds will not quickly heal.” Lewis B. Kaden, The 
People:  No! Some Observations on the 1967 New York State Constitutional 
Convention, 5 HARV. J. ON LEG. 343, 359 (1968).  The proposal was ultimately 
UNDERKUFFLER_BLAINEDEBATE-PP.DOC 2/25/2004  1:43 PM 
196 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2 
have been part of the historical background for some of these laws, 
decisions to retain them in the twentieth century undoubtedly 
reflect far more complex understandings.40 Just as our collective 
understanding of equal protection has advanced during the past 
hundred years, so has our understanding of religious freedom. 
Moreover, if religious bigotry, racism, sexism, or other dark 
motives of those who enact laws are fatal to those laws, few 
eighteenth or nineteenth century laws would survive legal scrutiny 
today. The federal Constitution itself was adopted in a world that 
accepted and wished to preserve slavery, the disenfranchisement of 
women and the poor, and all forms of religious bigotry.  At the time 
of their enactment, the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment  
were viewed by the vast majority not as guarantors of individual 
religious freedom, but as guarantors that local religious 
establishments—which existed, in some form, in all of the 
American colonies—would not be threatened by a rival federal 
establishment.  These colonial establishments included the criminal 
prosecution of Quakers, Baptists, Jews, Catholics, Lutherans, 
Muslims, atheists, and others; the restriction of citizenship, the 
ability to hold office, and other civil rights to particular Protestants 
or to persons willing to swear to a particular religious creed; the 
                                                          
defeated.  Article VIII, section 2 of the Constitution of Michigan, which 
prohibits any “payment, credit, tax benefit, exemption or deductions, tuition 
voucher, subsidy, grant or loan of public monies . . . , directly or indirectly” to 
nonpublic schools, was adopted by popular referendum in 1970 after extensive 
public debate. See Traverse City Sch. Dist. v. Attorney General, 185 N.W.2d 9, 
13 (Mich. 1971).  Constitutional provisions in Washington, which prohibit the 
payment of any public money for “any religious worship, exercise or 
instruction, or the support of any religious establishment,” WASH. CONST. art. 
I, § 11, and which provide that “[a]ll schools maintained or supported wholly 
or in part by the public funds shall be forever free from sectarian control or 
influence,” were originally adopted in 1889, but were reconsidered and 
retained in 1904, 1958, and 1993. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11; art. IX § 4. 
40. Indeed, even those who raise the anti-Catholic argument 
acknowledge that the reasons for separation of church and state are far more 
complex today. See, e.g., Viteritti, supra note 16, at 559 n.10 (“I do not mean to 
suggest here that separationist instincts are largely motivated by religious 
bigotry.  Nevertheless, one cannot deny its influence in the historical 
development of the issue, nor that the relative neglect of its role on the part of 
legal scholars makes the story worth telling.”). 
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forced financial support of the colony’s official religion; and so on.41 
The truth of our history is that all religious groups, with the 
possible exception of narrow brands of Protestants, have been the 
subjects of religious persecution and religious bigotry.  I agree that 
we should be aware of the history of religious intolerance in this 
country—indeed, I believe that we should be acutely aware of that 
history as we consider the question before us. However, we must 
consider the contemporary purposes and effects of contemporary 
ratification of state separationist laws in determining their validity. 
If our objective is the promotion of religious tolerance and religious 
peace, forcing taxpayers to fund religious schools with which they 
deeply disagree will only work to our detriment. 
 
 
 
                                                          
41. See Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 15, at 879–91.  For instance, the 
New Jersey Constitution of 1776 provided that each person shall have “the 
inestimable privilege of worshipping God according to the dictates of his own 
conscience,” but public office was limited to those persons “professing a belief 
in the faith of any Protestant [Christian] sect.” N.J. CONST. of 1776, arts. 
XVIII–XIX, in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL 
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND 
COLONIES, NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 2594, 2597 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter 
CONSTITUTIONS].  The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 required the 
following oath for public office:  “I do believe in one God, the creator and 
governor of the universe, the rewarder of the good and the punisher of the 
wicked.  And I do acknowledge the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament 
to be given by Divine inspiration.”  PA. CONST. OF 1776, PLAN OR FRAME OF 
GOVERNMENT FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, § 10, in 5 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra at 3084, 3085.  The Delaware Constitution, ratified in 
1776, required all state officers to swear a Trinitarian oath and to declare their 
belief in the divine inspiration of the Scriptures.  DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 22, 
in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra at 562, 566. 
Religious intolerance was not limited to Protestant Christians.  When 
Maryland was a Roman Catholic colony, a penalty of death and forfeiture of 
estate was imposed on any person who “ ‘shall hence forth blaspheme 
God, . . . or deny our Savior Jesus Christ to be the Son of God, or shall deny 
the Holy Trinity of the Father the Son and the Holy Ghost, or the Godhead of 
any of the said three persons of the Trinity’ ”. LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, 
AND FREEDOM 83 (1953) (quoting the Maryland Act of Toleration of 1649). 
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